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Abstract
Peri-urban areas are often subject to intensive construction, through both formal and informal
processes. As land transitions from rural to urban status, different land tenure and administration
systems may come into conflict, leading to disputes, contestation and, in some cases, violence.
However, little is known about the precise causes of peri-urban land conflict. In Mexico, peri-
urban growth has historically proceeded peacefully, owing to the control exerted by a corporatist
system of government, and the political use of land tenure regularisation. However, the effects of
land reforms on transactions at the peri-urban fringe, in the context of wider processes of liberal-
isation, may be increasing vulnerability to conflict over land. This paper explores these issues
through a case study of an irregular settlement on the peri-urban fringe of the provincial Mexican
city of Xalapa, where contestations over informally developed land have escalated into violent
encounters between groups of settlers and the state. The findings show that vulnerability to con-
flict in peri-urban areas can be attributed to the interaction of macro-level processes with local-
level factors, including diverse claims, overlapping legal and governance frameworks and, critically,
local power relations.
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Introduction: The significance of
peri-urban land conflict
Observers suggest that conflict over land is
often particularly acute in the context of
rapid urban growth, and particularly in peri-
urban areas. As the costs of shelter and ser-
vices increase, and demand for serviced resi-
dential sites exceeds the supply of suitable
land, so competition for land becomes
more intense (DFID, 2002: 3). While diverse
conceptualisations of peri-urban areas
emphasise variables such as population size
and density, infrastructure provision, admin-
istrative boundaries and economic activities
(Allen, 2003), here these areas are under-
stood as zones of rapid change at the urban
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periphery, often characterised by land tran-
sitioning from rural to urban uses, where
different land systems may come into con-
flict (GLTN, 2008). They may contain high-
income gated communities and commercial
property in close proximity to low-income
neighbourhoods, or agricultural production
alongside the construction of large-scale resi-
dential estates. In particular, peri-urban
zones are often subject to unauthorised land
use, including informal1 settlements (Gashu,
2014), as informal land markets on the
urban fringe offer cheap, unserviced land for
those unable to access formal land and
housing markets.
The regulation of land tenure and rights
in such areas, which may be subject to rural
land management regimes despite the expan-
sion into them of urban land uses (Allen,
2003), is often inappropriate or confused.
The uncertainty over which land tenure
regimes are operating, the variety of differ-
ent actors and their competing claims to
land, and lack of administrative clarity and
capacity all contribute to the likelihood of
land conflict developing. Land tenure can be
understood as ‘the mode by which land is
held or owned, or the set of relationships
among people concerning land or its prod-
uct’ (Payne, 2001: 416). Drawing on theories
of property, tenure is often conceived of as a
‘bundle of rights’ (e.g. USAID (US Agency
for International Development), 2005), and
while this interpretation has been criticised
for its narrowness in terms of the social rela-
tionships that frame property claims (Ribot
and Peluso, 2003), it is helpful for identifying
the different interests in a given property
(Von Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006: 7), or in
this case plot of land. A piece of land may
have multiple users with specific rights, rang-
ing from limited to full use and transfer
rights; and different rights may refer to dif-
ferent legal norms. Land rights are therefore
diverse, in that they may belong to many
people, and varied, in that they may be
constituted in different ways. While property
rights must be recognised as context-specific,
political and subject to negotiation (Von
Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006: 7), the co-
existence of diverse rights to the same piece
of land is not uncommon, and is not neces-
sarily problematic.
However, land conflicts which are not
easily resolvable by existing law may be pro-
blematic for urban authorities and commu-
nities. For authorities at the local or national
level, the potential for land conflict to esca-
late into violence (Bruce, 2011) and the links
between tenure insecurity and urban insecur-
ity more broadly (UN-Habitat, 2007) make
it a critical issue. For the households and
communities involved, land disputes may
have devastating social impacts, including
loss of land, housing and neighbourhood;
and damage to community solidarity, in
addition to the long-term negative effects of
insecure land tenure (UN-Habitat, 2007).
Yet although there is a vast literature on
land conflict, there is surprisingly little analy-
sis of the factors contributing to conflict over
urban and peri-urban land.
In general terms, the analysis of land con-
flict has been approached in various ways:
for example, it may focus on the actors
involved (Barry et al., 2007); different land
regimes (USAID, 2005); the context in which
conflict occurs (Brown et al., 2005); or the
specific causal factors in a particular case
(Wehrmann, 2008). Relating to the last
aspect, a report by the European Union
identifies changes in population, the econ-
omy and the environment as factors generat-
ing land competition, which may develop
into conflict where ‘scarcity of resources is
increasing and access is reduced, where
tenure rules are unable to adjust sufficiently
rapidly to changing circumstances, and where
different and contradictory rules co-exist’
(EU, 2004: 6, emphasis added). Echoing this,
Baranyi and Weitzner (2006: 3) suggest that
the main sources of land tenure conflicts are
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‘competing claims to access rights, tenure
insecurity and unequal distribution of land’,
but they also highlight ‘alterations in the
social, political and economic balance’, such
as population increases, the development of
intensive farming, in-migration and changes
to land legislation.
In terms of peri-urban areas, which are
subject to rapid change of land use and dif-
ferent land systems, the local-scale factors of
competing claims and different frameworks
of rules are particularly salient. At the same
time, both of the above accounts highlight
the political economy of land, in terms of the
influence of larger scale changes in relevant
legal and governance frameworks accompa-
nying social, political and economic change
(see also Bruce, 2011). This concurs with the
assertion that while land conflict is ‘a site-
specific [phenomenon] deeply rooted in local
histories and social relations, [it is also] con-
nected to larger processes of material trans-
formation, political power, and historical
conjuncture’ (Simmons, 2004: 187).
This paper explores land conflict in the
context of peri-urban growth through an in-
depth case study of an informal settlement in
a provincial city in Mexico, a country under-
going profound economic, political and social
shifts, in the context of which land reform has
been undertaken. Mexico is a highly urba-
nised country, with 72% of its population of
112 million living in urban areas (CONAPO,
2012). Despite now being considered an upper
middle-income country, high levels of poverty
and inequality persist. In 2008, the proportion
of the urban population living in extreme
poverty was 11%, while 40% of Mexico’s
urban population was considered moderately
poor (CONEVAL, 2010: 13). Urban inhabi-
tants who cannot access land or housing via
the formal market often do so in settlements
with informal origins known as colonias popu-
lares, which have been estimated to contain
as much as 50% of all housing in Mexico
(CIDOC, 2012, in Solana, 2013: 1).
These settlements usually originate on
rural land at the urban periphery. They are
characterised by informal tenure and build-
ing construction outside urban regulatory
frameworks, but generally have good pros-
pects for consolidation and integration into
the urban fabric (Ward, 1999) because of the
rights held by land subdividers, political
dynamics and, since the 1970s, a policy of
land tenure regularisation.2 In general, infor-
mal urban expansion in Mexico has been
remarkable for its relatively peaceful nature.
However, recently observers have suggested
that land conflict in peri-urban areas may be
increasing because of changes to the legal
framework governing rural land, in the con-
text of the country’s economic liberalisation
(Salazar, 2012, 2014; Ugalde, 2012). The
effects of these changes on informal urban
expansion have so far been relatively under-
explored, and this paper also seeks to con-
tribute to a growing body of research
exploring their implications, alongside its
contribution to the debates on land conflict
mentioned above.
Drawing on these accounts, this paper
takes a broad political economy approach to
exploring the factors influencing vulnerabil-
ity to land conflict in a specific peri-urban
area of Mexico, in a context of wider social,
economic and political change. In the case of
Santa Lucia, an informal settlement at the
edge of the Xalapa Metropolitan Zone, the
prevalence of contested land in and around
the neighbourhood has led to intractable dis-
putes, which have periodically escalated into
conflicts and violent encounters between the
members and leaders of groups occupying
the land and the forces of law and order, as
well as between occupier groups and those
who claim original ownership of the land.
This has led to a situation where, as one local
news source put it, ‘[a]narchy and impunity
reign’ (Zavaleta, 2011b). However, the con-
flict cannot be understood without framing
it within wider processes of agrarian reform
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and the decline of the corporatist system in
Mexico.
The aim of the paper is therefore to
explore how and why peri-urban land con-
flict develops through an examination of the
specific case outlined above, based on a situ-
ated analysis that examines the contextual
factors that shape the situation, in conjunc-
tion with the local-level factors involved in
generating conflict. In support of this, the
next section gives a detailed account of how
and why the informal acquisition of and con-
struction on peri-urban land has generally
occurred peacefully in Mexico throughout
the 20th century, in terms of the influence of
Mexico’s corporatist system of governance
and the systematic implementation of land
tenure regularisation, drawing on a rich
body of literature from scholars of Mexican
urban development. This is followed by a
discussion of the impact of agrarian reform
on local land market dynamics, an area of
increasing interest to urban researchers. The
analysis of the empirical case draws on the
factors identified as specifically pertinent to
peri-urban conflict from the discussion
above, namely diverse claims and overlap-
ping frameworks, to explore how they inter-
act with wider processes of change; and a
third factor, local power relations, is intro-
duced, relating to changes engendered by lib-
eralisation and also, potentially, increasing
insecurity.
Urbanisation, conflict and control
in Mexico
From around the mid-20th century in
Mexico, colonias populares have been
formed on private land, through illegal (unli-
cenced) subdivision or invasion; or on ejidal
land, in which case illegal subdivision (deriv-
ing from the land’s inalienable nature) has
been more common than invasion. The legal
characteristics of each form of property have
a decisive influence on how a given
neighbourhood develops, along with contex-
tual political and legal factors such as differ-
ent degrees and forms of tolerance from
state institutions, and the variable applica-
tion of different legal norms (Azuela, 1989).
Observers generally agree that ejidal land
has been the most important source of
land for development in Mexican cities
(Austin, 1994). An ejido is a collectively
owned farming community, a form of land-
holding established by the post-
revolutionary Constitution of 1917, which
redistributed land from large estates to pea-
sant workers. By the 1990s, social property3
occupied more than 50% of the total land
area of Mexico (Assies and Duhau, 2009).
The basic structure of an ejido is its land,
members and governing bodies, as defined
in the Agrarian Law. Relating to land, the
elements of the ejido are parcels over which
individual members have use rights; com-
mon use land to which all members have
communal rights; and an area for human
settlement, where members of the ejido live.
There are three categories of membership
within an ejido: ejidatarios, who have rights
to land; avecindados, who live in the human
settlement area of the ejido but do not have
rights to land; and posesionarios, who have
recognised rights of possession to ejidal
plots, but do not enjoy the full rights of par-
ticipation in the affairs of the ejido that eji-
datarios exercise.4 Each ejido has three
governing bodies: a General Assembly, in
which all ejidatarios participate; an Ejidal
Commission, a body of representatives
elected for three years; and a Supervisory
Council, which oversees the activities of the
Commission and reports to the Assembly.
By the time of agrarian reforms in 1992,
much ejidal land had already been sold infor-
mally for urban expansion and low-income
housing, normally through subdivision and
at low prices because of its lack of infrastruc-
ture. Prior to the reforms, ejidal lands were
officially inalienable: under the ejidal system
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of land tenure, ejidatarios in effect enjoyed
use rights without the right to dispose of or
exchange the land. However, by the 1990s, it
was estimated that in Mexico, perhaps half
of urban land development had occurred
illegally on ejido land (Austin, 1994). In the
most common form of land sales, settlers
have, since at least the 1950s, bought land
from ejidatarios (directly or via intermedi-
aries) in transactions which are ‘non-exis-
tent’ in law (Azuela and Duhau, 1998: 159).
Despite some claims that there was ‘con-
flict and controversy’ over use and develop-
ment rights during the 1960s and 1970s
(Davis and Rosan, 2004), what is remark-
able about this process is how peacefully it
occurred in the majority of cases. Indeed, it
has been noted that ‘[c]ompared with many
countries in Latin America, in Mexico the
ejido has offered an important ‘‘safety
valve’’, such that urban development has
proceeded in a relatively peaceful fashion’
(Austin, 1994: 330). In Mexico, then, infor-
mal urbanisation on rural ejidal land at the
urban periphery has been understood to
have generally taken place ‘without causing
significant conflicts’ (Assies and Duhau,
2009: 379).
However, rather than suggesting that dis-
putes were absent from these processes, this
highlights how the corporatist political sys-
tem which prevailed for much of the 20th
century has been tolerant of or even compli-
cit in these processes. Jones and Varley
(1999: 15) highlight the ‘extraordinary com-
plexity of the problems that . accrued over
decades of illegal development around
Mexico’s cities’, as illegal activities such as
invasion, subdivision, sale of invaded land
and sale of the same plots more than once
were undertaken by landowners and squat-
ters but also intermediaries. The state’s
attempts to adjudicate between different
interests, via regularisation where possible,
rested on identifying the actors involved, and
securing their cooperation. However, the
state’s role was far from neutral. Durand’s
(1983) detailed ethnographic study of a
neighbourhood developed informally on eji-
dal land to the south of Mexico City relates
how struggles among the actors involved –
ejidatarios and their representative bodies,
settlers and associated social movements,
and local and federal institutions – saw pro-
test and violent repression giving way to
negotiation and co-optation of representa-
tive organisations. Ultimately, the response
of the party apparatus determined that of
local institutions under the corporatist sys-
tem, which tended to manipulate such situa-
tions in order to maintain social control
(Durand, 1983).
A corporatist system of governance
The PRI,5 which was in power in Mexico
from 1929 until the country’s first demo-
cratic elections in 2000, maintained its domi-
nance through a corporatist system of
governance, within which social and political
control was exercised in both rural and
urban areas through a strategy that com-
bined networks of patronage with fear of
repression. This rested on securing the sup-
port and compliance of three pillars: rural
workers, industrial labour and the ‘popular
sector’ (Assies and Duhau, 2009). The ‘reci-
procal obligation’ of clientelism offered ben-
efits for both the party and the urban poor,
enabling the party to maintain political sup-
port and control with minimum violence,
while offering the poor access to government
benefits and decision-makers (Montan˜o,
1976). Prior to the systematic implementa-
tion of land tenure regularisation pro-
grammes from the 1970s onwards, the
largely peaceful nature of informal settle-
ment was understood as linked to the cor-
poratist political system, within which the
informal subdivision of ejidos was tolerated
as a response to the high levels of housing
demand deriving from rural–urban
2704 Urban Studies 53(13)
 at Royal Hallamshire on November 4, 2016usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
migration, and more broadly, to rural and
urban poverty (Montan˜o, 1976).
Corporatism provided an effective system of
control through co-optation and other ‘soft’
mechanisms, backed up with the threat of
violent repression (Gilbert and Ward, 1985).
Despite this general tendency towards
peaceful informal development, some cities,
such as Mexico City and Monterrey, experi-
enced politically organised land invasion
during the 1970s (Varley, 1998), leading
some analysts to suggest that low-income
groups were, at that time, strong and system-
atically organised. Social movements such as
the Movimiento Urbano Popular (Mexico
City) and Tierra y Libertad (Monterrey)
encouraged residents to demand housing,
land and services through invasions and
community self-organisation (Moctezuma,
2001). Tierra y Libertad represented a high
point of settlement-based collective organisa-
tion. During Echeverrı´a’s presidency (1970–
1976), the movement established an autono-
mous community based around several
informal neighbourhoods on the periphery
of Monterrey, which it had helped to found
through organised land invasion, and where
it provided services including policing, edu-
cation and healthcare (Vellinga, 1989).
However, by the late 1970s, the national gov-
ernment’s offer of regularised land tenure
and basic service provision, combined with
increased repression at the State level, led to
its splintering and decline.
While settlement-based collective mobili-
sation has been celebrated by some for its
radical aims and achievements, it appears to
have been exceptional rather than wide-
spread (Azuela and Tomas, 1996). Although
social movements remained prominent in
Mexico City in the 1980s, the 1990s saw
social movements shift away from political
initiatives towards projects of self-reliance
and participatory planning (Moctezuma,
2001). The case of Tierra y Libertad demon-
strates the corporatist regime’s capacity to
manage dissent and conflict through repres-
sion and co-optation, particularly in the con-
text of precariety (Vellinga, 1989). In
addition, the systematic use of regularisation
since the 1970s suggested its increasing
importance as a mechanism of control used
by the state in response to actual and poten-
tial social conflict.
This includes conflict deriving from more
prosaic (i.e. not politically motivated) forms
of invasion. Although a lack of data impedes
drawing firm conclusions, in general, orga-
nised invasion as a form of acquiring land
for informal settlement is understood as
having been less significant in Mexico than
the process of informal subdivision on
ejidal land outlined above (Azuela, 1989).
However, research in the 1980s suggested
that where invasion did occur on ejidal land,
it was often accompanied by some form of
dispute, often involving groups with ‘essen-
tially the same class affiliation’ – namely eji-
datarios and settlers – backed up by different
government institutions (Connolly, 1982:
161; see also Durand, 1983). Azuela (1989)
suggests that conflict may arise because of
the inherent tension between the protection
of private property under a capitalist regime,
and the revolutionary origins of the Mexican
state, which included the sanctioning of
land occupation, meaning that ‘[t]olerance
of direct occupation of land is not alien to
the Mexican political system, in which evic-
tion is not as simple as in other countries’
(Azuela, 1989: 98; author’s translation).
Thus a historical perspective on invasion in
urban Mexico suggests that informal ejidal
land sale, regularisation and invasion are
deeply entangled, as invasion may be pro-
moted by the legal limbo which results from
informal land sale.
Regularisation as a means of control
The initial aim of the national policy of sys-
tematically regularising informal settlements,
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adopted in the 1970s, may have been ‘to
counter the political influence of opposition
movements with a territorial basis in illegal
settlements’ (Varley, 1993: 261), such as
Tierra y Libertad; however, as discussed
above, the majority of settlements were nei-
ther invasions nor politically conflictive, sug-
gesting a more generalised political usage of
the policy (Varley, 1993). Its adoption coin-
cided with a period of burgeoning social and
political unrest, based on dissatisfaction at
the uneven distribution of the fruits of the
‘Mexican miracle’ of preceding decades. The
response of the Echeverrı´a administration
was populist (Varley, 1998), leading observ-
ers to recognise that ‘land tenure legalization
. played an important part in maintaining
political stability in the urban areas’, based
on the social and political integration of the
urban poor, within a regime where they oth-
erwise lacked adequate representation
(Varley, 1993: 249).
The establishment of the Commission
for the Regularisation of Land Tenure
(CORETT) in 1974, the main function of
which was to legalise informal settlement on
subdivisions of ejidal land in urban areas,
institutionalised land tenure regularisation
as a ‘core urban policy’ (Assies and Duhau,
2009: 379). From 1974 to 2000, CORETT
regularised 136,000 ha of informally settled
land and issued around 2.2 million titles to
low-income urban settlers who had illegally
bought subdivided land (Assies and Duhau,
2009).6 In many settlements, regularisation
has been used to redirect political activity
and demand-making towards pursuing
secure tenure and settlement upgrading
through official channels, fostering a pater-
nalistic relationship between urban settlers
and the state – embodied by the central role
of the Mexican President who authorises all
expropriations (Azuela and Duhau, 1998;
Varley, 1993, 1998).
Regularisation in Mexico became particu-
larly widespread during the presidency of
Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994), with the
effect of reproducing and accelerating the
process of low-cost illegal subdivision of eji-
dal land (Azuela and Duhau, 1998; Azuela
and Tomas, 1996). Salinas’ pursuit of poli-
cies in support of economic and political lib-
eralisation entailed a shift away from a
purely clientelist motivation towards more
general deregulation of land markets
(Jones et al., 1993). However, at the same
time, regularisation became a central element
of the ‘neopopulist’ National Solidarity
Programme (PRONASOL), a Presidential
initiative to fund public works. The political
nature of this programme was suggested by
the fact that settlements with stronger links
to the ruling PRI were likely to be able to
access funds more easily (Assies and Duhau,
2009; Azuela and Duhau, 1998; Jones et al.,
1993). In Mexico, then, ‘ejidal land develop-
ments and regularisation have formed an
important part of the leitmotif of political
mediation and statecraft’ (Austin, 1994:
329).
Agrarian reform and its
implications for informal peri-
urban settlement
As part of Salinas’ ongoing programme of
liberalisation, the 1992 Agrarian Law and
the amendment of Article 27 of the
Constitution7 produced radical changes in
the ejidal system. The reforms aimed to
modernise the agrarian sector and make
land markets more efficient by opening up
opportunities for real estate investment.
Breaking the political taboo of protecting
ejidal land ownership, the reforms gave eji-
datarios the right to legally sell, rent, share-
crop or mortgage – although not to
subdivide – their land parcels, subject to the
approval of the ejido’s general assembly;
they also enabled private capital (including
foreigners) to purchase former ejido holdings
(Austin, 1994).
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As part of these reforms, a programme of
land certification was established, with the
objective of assigning formal titles to all par-
ticipating ejidatarios and other rights hold-
ers. Based on a census of ejidal land, in 1993
PROCEDE (the Ejidal Rights Certification
Programme) was implemented. The pro-
gramme aimed to address the high levels of
informality and poverty associated with this
form of land tenure; to bring clarity and cer-
tainty to rural property ownership; to free
ejidatarios from their dependent relationship
with the state; and to facilitate the entry of
ejidal land into formal land markets, thus
stimulating the extension of credit as well as
external investment (Duhau, 2009; Salazar,
2012). By 2005 this free voluntary pro-
gramme had issued formal titles to 96% of
all ejidos (Assies and Duhau, 2009: 372),
benefiting over 4.5 million ejidatarios, pose-
sionarios and avecindados through certifica-
tion of their land (Salazar, 2012).
Suggestions that ejidos were being priva-
tised (Nuijten, 2003) or deregulated (Austin,
1994) refer to the second stage of the process,
which has been less well-subscribed. This
involves converting ejidal land (or social
property) into private property via the issue
of individual freehold titles (dominio pleno)
to ejidatarios, thus disincorporating the land
from the ejido and conferring full rights of
use and transfer on the title holder. Dominio
pleno can only be applied to land parcels
over which individuals have use rights. By
2006, dominio pleno had been sought for only
1.4% of eligible ejidal land, indicating that in
general, certification has occurred without
disincorporation (Assies and Duhau, 2009:
371).
However, predictions that the reform
would end informal land sales have not been
borne out; several years later, Jones and
Ward (1998: 82) suggested that ‘it has been
largely ‘‘business as usual’’’ as regards illegal
urban development. Two main explanations
have been advanced for the limited take-up
of freehold title. First, it is suggested that the
process of obtaining title encounters obsta-
cles, including the costs or time involved; a
lack of information regarding ejidatarios’
rights; or the involvement of coyotes8 who
‘convince ejidatarios that it is their land, and
theirs to sell’, even before they have received
legal title (Jones and Ward, 1998: 86). In
particular, Duhau (2009: 404–405) observes
a lack of clarity among ejidatarios and their
representatives regarding the difference
between, on the one hand, the need for free-
hold title to be obtained in order to sell the
land formally; and on the other, for an
application for land use change to be made
to the local authority, in order to be able to
develop the land legally. The unclear provi-
sions of the Agrarian Law in this respect
may mean that ejidatarios are at risk of con-
travening it or of being manipulated in land
transactions. Second, the low take-up of
individual freehold title may also be because
land is seen as ‘much more than a commod-
ity’ for the ejido, which offers its members
benefits in terms of status, organisational
power and subsistence farming in times of
crisis (Assies and Duhau, 2009: 381–382), as
well as identity, patrimony and a place of
residence (Quintana et al., 1998, in Duhau,
2009: 403).
In addition to the provisions outlined
above, the 1992 Agrarian Law established
new channels of land tenure regularisation,
with potentially far-reaching effects relating
to informal settlement. Specifically,
CORETT’s dominance in the field of regu-
larisation of human settlements since 1974
was challenged by the granting of new pow-
ers to ejidatarios, through the institution of
the Ejidal Assembly, to ‘[take] decisions
relating to who is recognised as legitimate
possessors of urban sites’ (Salazar, 2012:
283). As Salazar (2012) explains, in terms of
land already settled, the law makes provision
for the ejidal assembly to regularise the
illegal alienation of ejido land through
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recognising possession, as well as allowing
for its legal alienation through the creation
of reserve land for human settlement. In
support of this process, ejidatarios have
increasingly contracted private developers or
consultants to assist them with subdivision.
In terms of selling ejidal land, these provi-
sions allow ejidatarios to seek to realise the
market value of their land from private
development companies who prefer to
acquire the land informally and regularise
via the ejido, at a better price and without
having to wait for dominio pleno to be
expedited.
The entry of new private actors and the
diminished powers and role of CORETT
have changed local land market dynamics
(Salazar, 2012). As predicted by Jones and
Varley (1999), regularisation of informal set-
tlement carried out by ejidos in conjunction
with private consultants, rather than by
CORETT, may be disadvantageous for set-
tlers on several grounds. These include the
loss of legal certainty granted by the state;
the loss of access to CORETT’s subsidised
programme and the resulting higher costs;
the higher prices at which land is available
for sale; and the length of time regularisa-
tion takes (Salazar, 2012). As a result, the
terms on which subdivided plots are avail-
able for sale are more unfavourable to
potential settlers and have weakened their
security of tenure, as they are more depen-
dent than before on the disposition of the
ejidatario to recognise their possession of the
land (Salazar, 2012).
However, as Duhau (2009: 399) points
out, in a context of peri-urban growth, the
pressure to sell, whether legally or illegally,
may also disadvantage ejidatarios, forcing
them to accept suboptimal offers for their
land, as well as weakening their ability to act
collectively. Thus where regularisation is dri-
ven by an ejido rather than CORETT, the
potential for intractable social conflict may
be significantly increased, not only because
of the less favourable terms for settlers, but
also because of the ejidatarios’ potential vul-
nerability to exploitation.9 Some of these
effects are only now being observed, as the
interpretation of the legal reforms and the
outcomes of ejidal land transactions become
more evident. At the same time, changing
contextual factors may make resolution less
likely. In the next section, a specific case of
conflict over informal settlement on ejidal
land at the edge of Xalapa is analysed to
identify the factors involved.
Peri-urban land conflict in Xalapa
The case presented here, analysed as part of
a wider research project on urban land con-
flict in Mexico, was selected for its represen-
tativeness with regard to land transactions
(the informal sale of ejidal land), the diver-
sity of actors and claims involved, and the
intractable nature of the dispute. Given the
limited availability of data for analysing
urban land conflict in Mexico, a qualitative,
case study approach was applied. A single
case study allows in-depth exploration of a
specific conflict at the micro scale, necessary
to understand the conjunction of ‘spatiohis-
torical circumstances’ and exogenous factors
(Simmons, 2004: 197).
As the medium-sized capital of the State
of Veracruz, Xalapa has experienced signifi-
cant growth along with high levels of urban
informal settlement. From 1980 to 2000, its
population increased from 205,594 to
390,590 (Benı´tez et al., 2011), swelled by
many ‘rural refugees of economic reform’
who were fleeing the effects of economic
restructuring and commodity price fluctua-
tions (Meyers, 2003: 77). While the munici-
pality of Xalapa has a current population of
457,928, the population of the Xalapa
Metropolitan Zone (XMZ), which is com-
prised of seven municipalities, is 666,535
(SEDESOL, 2010).10 With an economy
based on commerce and service functions,
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downturns resulting from the economic
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s contributed
to the informalisation of the city’s economy
and declining standards of living. Figures
from 2008 showed that 76% of Xalapa’s
population earns five minimum salaries or
less (Benı´tez et al., 2011). Land for housing
may be delivered by the state, private actors
or the ejidal market, but in practice the latter
remains the main source. It is estimated that
54% of Xalapa’s surface area is occupied by
informal settlements (Benı´tez et al., 2011),
and most new residential construction is still
informal, accompanied latterly by expanses
of middle-income housing, often in peri-
urban areas.
While subdivision of ejidal land thus
appears to be the primary form of providing
land for low-income settlement, the regional
history of invasion in Xalapa and Veracruz
suggests specific sensitivities around infor-
mal settlement that are worth mentioning
briefly. Drawing inspiration from the
anarchist-led tenants’ movement in Veracruz
port in the 1920s (Castells, 1983), as well as
the national Movimiento Urbano Popular,
settlers’ movements in Xalapa in the 1980s
used land invasion as a means of securing
land for housing but also in support of polit-
ical aims. The most prominent was the
Veracruz Tenants’ and Housing Petitioners’
Union (UCISV-Ver),11 formed in the 1980s
by two sociology professors from the
Universidad Veracruzana, which carried out
organised land invasions leading to the
establishment of colonias populares such as
Revolucio´n and Moctezuma on the city per-
iphery. Although land invasions are less
common now, a persistent anxiety over their
consequences can be detected in the local
news media, making it difficult to distin-
guish between authentic cases of invasion,
and situations labelled as such for sensation-
alist or political reasons.
The informal neighbourhood discussed
here, Santa Lucia, is situated in a zone of
peri-urban growth which contains both
informal and formal development on for-
merly ejidal land. As well as Santa Lucia, it
includes more consolidated colonias popu-
lares with informal origins, and middle-
income formal housing. This growth zone
was identified from a review of local news
media and interviews with local officials,
civil society organisations and academics. A
total of 16 semi-structured interviews was
carried out with key informants who were
resident in this peri-urban zone during the
period October 2011 to March 2012, includ-
ing residents of Santa Lucia, the ejido to
which the land belonged, and an adjacent
colonia popular. Access to the neighbour-
hoods in the zone was obtained, respectively,
via an intermediary in Santa Lucia, the ejidal
commission in the rural settlement, and the
residents’ committee in the adjacent colonia.
The discussion that follows is based on the
16 interviews mentioned above and an addi-
tional nine semi-structured interviews with
officials from local, State and Federal
authorities, as well as information gathered
from local media and academic sources.
It should be noted that the insecure and
threatening situation in Santa Lucia, along
with the longstanding and complex nature of
the conflict, gave rise to some methodologi-
cal difficulties that are common in research-
ing land-related conflict (e.g. Tomei, 2014).
Owing to the security situation in Santa
Lucia, access to the neighbourhood was
severely limited; and of the 16 interviews car-
ried out, only two were with residents of
Santa Lucia per se (as opposed to people
from the surrounding area), along with
informal conversations with a handful of
other residents. Owing to the difficulty of
interviewing residents, local news media
sources were also consulted, especially for
correspondence from residents and original
buyers, and these accounts were triangulated
against other sources including expert and
official interviews. However, the confused
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and contradictory nature of accounts from
parties with diverse interests in the conflict
complicated the task of reconstructing a
coherent narrative, suggesting the need for a
flexible approach to the notion of a single
‘truth’ emerging from the analysis of land
conflict.
Santa Lucia
The informal settlement of Santa Lucia is
located in the southeast of the Xalapa
Metropolitan Zone, just inside the boundary
of the municipality of Emiliano Zapata (see
Figure 1), in an area adjacent to two large
formal middle-income housing estates. The
settlement originated in 1995, when ejidatar-
ios from the ejido Estanzuela ‘sold’ 72 ha of
parcelled land adjacent to Xalapa’s urban
fringe to individual purchasers via local
‘developers’ Banda Rivas and Company.
The ejido did not undergo the PROCEDE
certification programme until 2000, meaning
it did not have the option to legally sell until
then; however, the land sale in 1995 also
suggests that ejidatarios were not prepared
to wait for this process in order to sell. The
basis for the transaction was an agreement
between the ejidatarios and the private com-
pany for the latter to act as a consultant and
intermediary in the process of informal land
sale to third parties, followed by subsequent
regularisation by the ejidal authorities, an
arrangement only possible following the
1992 reforms. The initial action involved
part of the 72 ha being subdivided into over
2000 unserviced plots of around 160 m2. Of
these plots 400 were then sold to individuals
at a fixed cost of $8,500MXN,12 forming the
neighbourhood referred to here as Santa
Lucia.13
These sales appear to have been made
largely via a movement known as the
Veracruz Housing Coalition, led by Banda
Figure 1. Map showing urban boundaries and case study location (adapted from Benı´tez et al., 2011).
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Rivas director Hugo Banda, mainly to indi-
vidual lower middle-income buyers such as
public-sector workers seeking affordable
land for housing. Owing to the ejidal nature
of the land, the sales were informal, although
buyers received a transfer agreement in the
form of a cesio´n de derechos, a document
signed by the ejidal assembly in which the eji-
datario concerned ceded his or her use rights
pending regularisation, which nevertheless is
not considered to have judicial weight. In
December 1995, the sale of these plots came
to the attention of SEDUVER, the Urban
Development Department of the State of
Veracruz. In October 1996, SEDUVER took
the unusual step of lodging a complaint with
the State Public Ministry (Secretarı´a del
Gobierno) against the responsible parties – in
this case, the ejidatarios who were still in legal
possession of the land – for unauthorised sub-
division and fraudulent sale of untitled ejidal
land (Daniel Martı´ Capitanachi, personal
communication, 11 July 2014). This led to the
questioning and detention of several
ejidatarios.
According to representatives of the ejido,
the uncertainty generated by the legal case,
and the subsequent delay in regularisation
and service provision, made many buyers
reluctant to invest in developing their plots
(interview with ejidatarios). They also sug-
gested that the delay was because the pro-
ceeds of the sales had not been passed on to
them by the developer, leading them to
obstruct the regularisation process. From
1996 to 2009, the majority of these plots
remained uninhabited, although some buy-
ers erected fencing to demonstrate posses-
sion. Apparently as a consequence of this
lack of development, from around 2007 land
invasions were observed on the site, coming
to public attention in August 2009, when the
local media began reporting on the ‘invasion’
of the land by Santa Lucia Civil Association
(SLCA). The leaders of this organisation,
political aspirants who claimed that they
were appropriating the empty plots in
response to the housing need of vulnerable
urban populations, in fact illegally sold these
plots to their members.
In July 2000, the certification of the ejido
via PROCEDE was agreed, but the plot of
land on which Santa Lucia is located was
excluded because of the legal dispute. At the
same meeting in 2000 in which the ejido
agreed to participate in PROCEDE, ejido
members voted to recognise existing occu-
pants of land belonging to Estanzuela, a
move that was only possible because of the
1992 reforms. This suggests that the ejido
had started the process of regularising infor-
mal land sales through recognising some
individuals who had bought land in the orig-
inal transactions in 1995 as posesionarios,
although it was not possible to verify further
details of this.14
Currently, around half of the plots
there are inhabited, mainly by members of
the SLCA, who are generally vulnerable.
Although weekly monetary collections are
made by the association, services are poor,
with no drainage, paving or rubbish collec-
tion, and only informally supplied water and
electricity. The site has become known for
high levels of social conflict between the dif-
ferent groups making claims to the land,
which reflects and reproduces the uncertain
living conditions. By 2010, over 100 criminal
complaints had been made to the Veracruz
Public Ministry about Santa Lucia, includ-
ing several reports of violence to the Public
Safety Department (Zavaleta, 2010). In 2010
and 2011, leaders of the SLCA were impri-
soned for selling plots illegally (Zavaleta,
2011b); subsequently, in the last four years
there have been several evictions by the
State Government, such as the eviction of 14
plots in April 2011, and 15 in January 2012
(Zavaleta, 2011b, 2012). These evictions
seem to have followed recognition of claims
by the original buyers following their legal
assignation as posesionarios by the ejido.
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However, on other occasions, evictions
have been postponed because of armed resis-
tance from the residents (Aguilar, 2012;
Herna´ndez, 2012). Original buyers have
complained of intimidation and threats with
machetes, stones and sticks when they have
attempted to reclaim their land; resident
SLCA members were reported to have
attacked the association’s leaders after a dis-
pute (Aguilar, 2012; Zavaleta, 2011a); and
aggression from the organisation towards its
members is common. The situation has con-
tinued to deteriorate: in August 2014, reports
emerged that Gabriel Nava Lopez, identified
as one of the ‘leaders’ of Santa Lucia, had
been ‘executed’ at his home in the neighbour-
hood by a group of armed men (Cancino,
2014).
The remainder of this paper explores the
recent conflict in Santa Lucia, drawing on
the factors identified above to explore the
role of diverse claims to the land, and over-
lapping legal and governance frameworks, in
the context of the wider changes outlined in
earlier sections. Based on the research find-
ings, an additional factor of local power rela-
tions is identified and discussed.
Analysis of land conflict in Santa
Lucia: Diverse claims, overlapping
frameworks and power relations
Diverse claims to land rights
The complexity and intractability of the land
conflict in Santa Lucia reflects the diverse
interests of the actors involved in the land
transactions there. While diverse and varied
rights to a given piece of land are common,
conflict may arise where different claims are
in competition (e.g. Baranyi and Weitzner,
2006). The current conflicts in Santa Lucia
centre on the competition between the rights
and claims of three of the groups mentioned
above – the members of the ejido; the origi-
nal buyers of subdivided plots; and the
current residents, members of the SLCA –
which vary in terms of their strength, a situ-
ation which has been further exacerbated by
the reforms.
The ejidatarios’ rights consist in their jur-
isdiction over the transfer or disposal of the
land, in the sense that since 1992, they have
been entitled to undertake regularisation
themselves once agreement is reached by the
ejidal assembly. The original buyers, most of
whom have documentation of their purchase
in the form of a cesio´n de derechos or trans-
fer agreement, are not in occupation of the
land, weakening their claim to ownership
rights. However, the process of recognition
by the ejido in 2000, mentioned above,
appears to have benefited some of these indi-
viduals through formalising their status as
posesionarios. They have been able to use
this status in support of their claim that they
bought in good faith, enabling some to
obtain court orders which have allowed
them to evict the current occupants and
reclaim their plots. The claims of the original
buyers, who acquired the land informally,
are privileged over those of current occu-
piers of the site, despite the fact that, as a
representative of the Agrarian Ombudsman
pointed out, ‘Their papers have no legal
weight’ (interview with Official 1). This sug-
gests the political nature of the conflict, dis-
cussed further below.
This process also reveals the highly inse-
cure situation of the current residents, who
have de facto use rights but no documenta-
tion – one respondent estimated that only
5% of current residents have any form of
document of sale (interview with residents of
Santa Lucia). Paradoxically, because undo-
cumented occupiers are dependent on the
SLCA to pursue their claims for regularisa-
tion, the organisation is able to maintain its
control of the settlement, a central factor in
the ongoing conflict. At the same time, evi-
dence of the association’s aggressive tactics
towards residents also emerged, as it was
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reported that residents who do not ‘coop-
erate’ financially with the SLCA are threat-
ened with their provisional services being cut
off or violent eviction. Residents thus suffer
double insecurity of tenure, based on their
fear of eviction by either the association or
the state, accompanied by a fear of violence
perpetrated either by the association or, in
the case of official evictions, by the forces of
law and order. In the words of the above
resident, the ‘law of the jungle’ prevails
(interview with residents of Santa Lucia).
The lack of legal resolution to the situation,
despite the involvement of a variety of insti-
tutional actors – including the current ejidal
commission of Estanzuela, the municipalities
of Xalapa and Emiliano Zapata, CORETT,
the State Government Department, the
State Property Department and the
Agrarian Ombudsman, advising the ejidal
commission – suggests that the arbitration
of these claims is elusive, reflecting the over-
lapping frameworks that may characterise
peri-urban land markets.
Overlapping legal and governance
frameworks
The nature of peri-urban areas means that
they may be more subject to overlapping
legal and governance frameworks than other
parts of the city. At the same time, the
‘uneasy’ nature of this setting, ‘characterized
by . the loss of ‘‘rural’’ aspects . [and a]
lack of ‘‘urban’’ attributes’ (Allen, 2003:
136), may result in a ‘legal limbo’ for resi-
dents as their neighbourhoods are consid-
ered neither rural nor urban (Lombard,
2014). In Santa Lucia, despite informal pro-
cesses of urbanisation, the land is still offi-
cially rural, in the sense that the ejido still
has legal possession of it. Moreover, the plot
is still designated as having rural land use
under the municipal planning framework.
Ejidal land that has been informally settled
is ‘legally invisible’ as urban land to the
Xalapa Department of Urban Development;
legal visibility can only occur following regu-
larisation, and with a formally recognised
change of land use category (Martı´, 2008),
after which urban infrastructure is more
likely to be installed.
This situation reflects and may exacerbate
tension and potential overlap between the
competencies of different municipalities
within the same metropolitan zone. Santa
Lucia is situated in the municipality of
Emiliano Zapata, within the boundary of the
Xalapa Metropolitan Zone. The
Municipality of Xalapa is not responsible for
servicing settlements outside its own bound-
ary – even those within the Metropolitan
Zone (interview with Official 5) – meaning
that Emiliano Zapata has formal responsibil-
ity for this. However, in Emiliano Zapata,
63% of the population earn less than two
minimum salaries, compared with 45% in
Xalapa, underpinning its limited financial
capacity. Thus Santa Lucia’s residents have
recently appealed to the Xalapa Municipal
Government to improve their drinking water
supply (Cancino, 2014). In the absence of a
metropolitan authority, and with poor rela-
tions between the two municipalities gener-
ated by a dispute over municipal boundaries
in 2005 which resulted in the restitution of
land to Xalapa (Gamboa 2007), there has
been no coordination between them over
Santa Lucia. This is exacerbated by party
politics, with Emiliano Zapata currently led
by the left-wing PRD, and Xalapa by the
PRI, in alignment with the PRI-dominated
State government (Mauricio Herna´ndez
Bonilla, personal communication, 11
November 2014).
Some respondents suggested that there is
also a mismatch between social and private
property regimes, which may be more salient
in peri-urban areas. A respondent from the
State Property Department suggested that
these regimes are based on ‘two different
logics’, giving rise to conflict between rural
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and urban land management systems (inter-
view with Official 6). In the eyes of an infor-
mant from the Xalapa Department of Urban
Development:
The ejido is effectively . social property, a
legacy of the Mexican Revolution. It’s not very
clear where the authority of the ejido ends and
the authority of the municipality begins .
each is protected by their norms. (Interview
with Official 5)
Not only is the process by which land transi-
tions between these two spheres at issue, the
reforms have also conferred conflicting com-
petencies on ejidos and urban authorities
with respect to urbanising land (Martı´,
2008). In particular, the agrarian reforms of
1992 complicated the process of regularisa-
tion, by granting authorities beyond
CORETT the power to regularise informal
subdivision, as outlined above.
Local power relations
Along with the two factors outlined above,
which concur with the literature on land con-
flict, an additional, highly salient factor iden-
tified from the research is local power
relations, underpinning the diversity of
claims and overlapping jurisdictions. This is
particularly relevant in peri-urban areas
where diverse interests may be accompanied
by a lack of judicial clarity, as suggested
above. The conflicting claims to the land
resulting from the land invasion, and the
overlapping legal competencies relating to
regularisation, have led to a power vacuum
of which the association has taken advantage
to consolidate its de facto control of the
neighbourhood and its land market.
Although the Association presents its role
within the neighbourhood as one of pursuing
negotiations with the local government for
tenure and service provision, its dominance
of the land market there includes the threat
of interrogation and ‘removal’ of individuals
acquiring land independently (interview with
residents of Santa Lucia), suggesting its
interest in maintaining the current status
quo.
Recent judicial proceedings represent a
challenge to this status quo, but with poten-
tially negative effects for the residents.
Moreover, the positions taken by some of
the key actors, including the two municipali-
ties involved, suggest that ‘land is a political
instrument’ (interview with Official 4). This
implies a degree of official tolerance of the
SLCA’s control of the land market in Santa
Lucia, as a strategy to avoid more disruptive
conflict over demands for land and housing,
which can take the form of demonstrations,
occupation of municipal installations and so
on, potentially affecting the city as a whole.
In the post-corporatist setting of Mexico,
the traditional strategies for resolution of
social conflict, such as control, co-optation
and repression, are no longer employed so
openly; however, the legacy of the corpora-
tist era means that clientelism, patronage
and populism are still prevalent in urban
governance (Guarneros-Meza, 2009).
Meanwhile, the configuration of local
power relations has shifted, partly because
of the changes to regularisation engendered
by the reforms discussed above, but also
relating to the wider context of increasing
liberalisation, accompanied by heightened
insecurity. With regard to the former consid-
eration, an intriguing figure in this case is
that of the developer contracted to assist the
ejido in informal subdivision. While ascer-
taining the precise motivations of the com-
pany is difficult given the historical
dimension of the case, it was alleged in cer-
tain sections of the popular press, and by
some respondents, that this organisation
was also responsible for the subsequent
invasion of the land and the illegal resale of
the plots, under the guise of the ‘Santa
Lucia Civil Association’ (interview with resi-
dents of Santa Lucia). Some also suggested
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that this company had links to higher order
authorities and actors, with allegations that
the original buyers were linked to the
PAN,15 while the SLCA was apparently
affiliated to the PRI via the previous gover-
nor of the State of Veracruz, with implica-
tions that he had sanctioned the invasion
(Zapata, n.d.). Other reports that the inva-
sion represents a ‘confluence of political and
economic interests’ (La Jornada Veracruz,
2011) concur with these interpretations.
At the same time, this case is suggestive
of ‘the link between tenure insecurity and
urban insecurity more broadly’ (UN-
Habitat, 2007). While the effects of narcovio-
lencia vary by region, Veracruz’s position as
a coastal state with strategic access to
Mexico City and fertile terrain means it is
‘vulnerable to drug trafficking and other ille-
gal activities associated with it’ (Guarneros-
Meza, 2015: 149). Heightened perceptions of
insecurity in the state (Becerra and Meza,
2014) have been exacerbated by a series of
high-profile and grisly acts of violence; the
presence of militarised police on the streets
of the region’s cites; and the unexplained
murders of several investigative journalists.
The latter have been linked to allegations of
high-level corruption and criminal infiltra-
tion of local and regional political structures
(e.g. Rodrı´guez, 2009), although these
remain unsubstantiated. While substantiat-
ing causal linkages between drugs violence
and land conflict is a difficult and sensitive
task, it appears that the prevailing climate of
insecurity may generate a situation in which
the authorities are loathe to intervene owing
to lack of capacity and fear of further vio-
lence (Guarneros-Meza, 2015). In the case
of Santa Lucia, the reporting of the 2014
murder of a local leader as an ‘execution’
suggests that the dominant organisation
there may now be imbricated in complex
and dangerous wider networks, further
increasing the potential for insecurity.
The land conflict in Santa Lucia therefore
both reflects the enduring nature of certain
arrangements of power relations in Mexico
and highlights shifts that have reconfigured
others. The state’s dominance prevails, in the
sense that the rules are still set centrally, as in
the corporatist era, and this is bolstered by
support from the ejidatarios, who retain their
privileged status compared with low-income
settlers, who in turn find themselves vulnera-
ble to multiple insecurities. At the same time,
the potential for a legal limbo to develop in
peri-urban areas, in which overlapping and
inconsistent legal and governance frameworks
can lead to a lack of clarity, may compound
the complexities resulting from attempts to
open up the agrarian land market, involve
new actors and increase the options for regu-
larisation. In the case of Santa Lucia, this has
generated a stalemate that ultimately fosters
further conflict, compounded by an overt ten-
dency towards aggression on the part of the
association in de facto control of the settle-
ment where insecurity is prevalent, suggesting
the state no longer has a monopoly of vio-
lence in this area.
Conclusion
This paper explores the factors contributing
to land conflict in peri-urban areas, by
focusing on a single case of informal settle-
ment within the wider urban and political
context in Mexico. A historical perspective
on informal urban growth showed that the
corporatist system of government in Mexico
worked to pre-empt conflict over land and
settlement, as well as responding to actual
social conflict by employing a strategy of
control, co-optation and repression. With
liberalisation, the systematic use of regulari-
sation came to the fore as the policy to
address low-income housing need. At the
same time, agrarian reforms were implemen-
ted, with potentially significant implications
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for peri-urban informal settlement and regu-
larisation that are only now being fully
appreciated.
In the case of Santa Lucia, on the out-
skirts of Xalapa, the acquisition of and con-
struction on land at the peri-urban fringe
was complicated by several factors which
contributed to the generation of violent con-
flict. The land sale which was the basis for
the settlement, which ejidatarios planned to
regularise under the provisions of the 1992
Agrarian Law, was informal. This gave rise
to legal proceedings and disputes over pay-
ment which led to delays in occupation and
the area’s subsequent invasion. The escala-
tion of the conflict in both social and legal
terms has led to the current intractable situa-
tion, in which several factors are salient.
Among the diverse claims on the land, those
of current residents are weakest, contribut-
ing to their insecurity; while the overlapping
jurisdiction of urban, ejidal, municipal and
State authorities in the peri-urban context
has contributed to the lack of a legal resolu-
tion to this dispute.
All land markets give rise to conflicts of
interest; but not all develop into violent con-
flict. Conflicts of interest in land development
processes, including informal ones, are likely
to reflect the wider political economy. A his-
torical perspective on ejidal subdivision and
invasion in Mexico reveals that aspects of this
situation are not unusual; but the acute and
intractable nature of this conflict makes it
particularly salient. The case has shown how
local factors interact with and are influenced
by wider factors. The analysis concurs with
the literature that diverse claims and overlap-
ping frameworks are key factors in land con-
flict, and shows that this is especially the case
in peri-urban areas where the diversity of
claims may be greater, and claimants may
refer to different frameworks which overlap
and sometimes come into conflict.
However, the case also shows that local
power relations are critical, and central to
understanding wider processes of change.
Such processes may incorporate land
reforms engendering the liberalisation and
deregulation of peri-urban land markets,
which ascribe new powers to certain actors,
at the expense of others. However, the pre-
vailing culture of power relations – in the
case of Mexico, shaped by the corporatist
culture – may prove obdurate, resulting in
factors that previously ameliorated conflict
now intensifying it. This may be exacerbated
by urban insecurity, suggesting a need for
further investigation of the link between
increasing insecurity and land conflict, bear-
ing in mind that the current lack of research
in this area may reflect the methodological
difficulties highlighted above.
Finally, it should be emphasised that in
examining cases of peri-urban land conflict,
the causes and consequences of such conflicts
are not restricted to informal settlements.
However, their effects are most acute in
informal settings. Moreover, while key actors
may include the state, urban political leaders,
and local associations, it is the communities
in which poor people live that are most likely
to be adversely affected by (sometimes vio-
lent) conflict over land, through its effects on
neighbourhood consolidation, as seen here;
and this, along with the need to better under-
stand the precise causes in distinct contexts,
merits further investigation.
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Notes
1. ‘Informal’ here is understood to encompass a
wide range of practices which take place
beyond regulatory frameworks, as this defini-
tion remains commonly used in many parts of
the world (recent conceptual debates around
the nature of informality notwithstanding).
2. The term ‘regularisation’ here refers to the
legalisation of land tenure through the issu-
ing of formal titles. This word is used in
keeping with the Latin American terminol-
ogy, in which ‘regularizacio´n’ usually refers
to this process, although the term sometimes
also connotes sociospatial integration
through upgrading following titling.
3. This term refers to both ejidos and comuni-
dades, the two forms of agrarian landhold-
ing established by the 1917 Constitution.
Comunidades, less significant numerically,
denote land occupied by indigenous groups
in the pre-Colonial period, restituted after
the Revolution (Azuela, 1989).
4. See Ley Agraria, Articles 12, 13 and 48.
Interestingly, the law does not give an expli-
cit definition of posesionarios and their rights
(Duhau, 2009).
5. Partido Revolucionario Institucional or
Revolutionary Institutional Party.
6. Regularisation by CORETT is a long process
with multiple phases, including: negotiation
with ejidatarios and occupants; assessment of
the area according to specific criteria and
municipal land use regulations; agreement
with the municipality; expropriation of the
land from the ejido to the President via
decree; payment to ejidatarios based on
CORETT’s formula; recognition of the site’s
occupants as legitimate owners; inscription of
the land in the Register of Private Property
in the name of the occupants. For a full
account of the process, see Salazar (2012).
7. Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution
refers to the nationalisation of land and
water, the division of large landholdings,
and their redistribution to communities.
8. Intermediaries in land deals, who are often
suspected of fraudulent activity.
9. An additional aim of the reforms was to
address conflicts and disputes over land,
which were common in ejidos, by setting up
a system of agrarian tribunals. While this
has generally been considered one of the
more successful aspects of the reforms, espe-
cially with regard to inheritance and bound-
ary disputes (Duhau, 2009), it does not
directly address conflicts over informal
urban settlement. See Appendini (2001) for
a detailed assessment of these measures.
10. The XMZ was officially defined in 2004 as
part of a national initiative to identify met-
ropolitan areas to increase planning and
economic efficiency in urban conurbations.
It contains the municipalities of Banderilla,
Coatepec, Emiliano Zapata, Xalapa,
Jilotepec, Rafael Lucio and Tlalnelhuayocan
(SEDESOL, 2010); however, a metropolitan
authority is yet to be formed.
11. Since the 1990s, the organisation (renamed
UCISV-Pobladores) has focused less on
political aims and more on its award-
winning housing and neighbourhood
improvement programme (Almaza´n, 2003).
12. In 1995 Mexico’s daily minimum wage was
$18.30MXN, or $2.39 according to 1995
exchange rates.
13. The plot was initially divided into two areas,
Santa Lucia I and II. The informal neigh-
bourhood described in this study is Santa
Lucia I, where these 400 plots are located,
referred to here simply as ‘Santa Lucia’ to
avoid confusion.
14. Current records show that there are 128 ave-
cindados, 80 posesionarios and 139 ejidatarios
in the ejido (RAN, 2014).
15. Partido Accio´n Nacional or National Action
Party, the centre-right opposition party in
Mexico.
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